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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
indefinite principles set forth by the court in this case will do little to
quiet litigation. It is to be desired and hoped that future decisions will
present clear and more easily determinable standards by which individual
cases may be uniformly decided.
LABOR LAW-UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE: DISCHARGE
FOR WHIPSAWING
Defendants were wholesale liquor dealers engaged in annual collective
bargaining agreements with the union representing their liquor salesmen.
An impasse was reached concerning salesmen's commissions during the
1949 negotiations. The union struck only one member of the multi-
employer bargaining unit and announced this to be the beginning of a
whipsawing action. The employers attempted to retaliate by locking
out their salesmen but the National Labor Relations Board ruled that
the salesmen had been discharged. The U.S. Court of Appeals held
that the companies could have successfully locked out their salesmen,
but by discharging them they were guilty of an unfair labor prac-
tice and the court allowed the National Labor Relations Board's award
of back pay to the union employees. NLRB v. Morand Bros. Beverage
Co., 204 F. 2d 529 (C.A. 7th, 1953).
In order to better understand the effect of this decision on labor-man-
agement relations, and to more easily comprehend the reasoning upon
which it is based, it is necessary to examine in more detail the factual
circumstances upon which it was decided.
When the union representing defendant's salesmen1 struck only one
member of the multi-employer bargaining unit,2 thus beginning a gen-
eral whipsawing action,8 the association, 4 according to prearranged plans,
sent to its salesmen a letter notifying them to turn in their accounts and
1 The exclusive collective bargaining agent for all salesmen of the Chicago Associ-
ation and of the Illinois Association, defendants in the instant case, was the Liquor
and Wine Salesmen's Union, Local 62, Distillery, Rectifying and Wine Workers Int'l
Union of America, AFL.
2 April 6, 1953, the union struck the Old Rose Distributing Co., a member of the
Illinois Association.
8 The term refers to a device by which the union strikes only one employer or a
small group of employers in the multi-employer bargaining unit and then moves on
to another small segment. The union can exert pressure on a single employer who
finds his fellow members of the bargaining unit gathering his market, while the union
can support the small part of its membership which is on strike almost indefinitely.
The technique is described in Leonard v. NLRB, 205 F. 2d 355, 356 (C.A. 9th, 1953)
and in "Whipsawing in Multi-Employer Bargaining," 3 Stanford L. Rev. 510 (1951).
4 Defendants in the initial action were all members of either the Illinois Wholesale
Liquor Dealers Association or the Chicago Wholesale Liquor Dealers Association,
both of which will hereinafter be referred to as the association.
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reports and to settle any cash differences with their employers.' The
salesmen were out from April 8th to May 1st, at which time all but one
of the approximately 800 returned to work.
The union went before the NLRB6 and the Board charged defendants
with violation of Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act,7
which provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer, by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any term
or condition of employment, to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization.8
The trial examiner found that the salesmen had been illegally locked
out and were entitled to back pay. The Board accepted this finding, but
held that the salesmen were discharged and not merely locked out.9 On
appeal, the Circuit Court ruled that a lockout in this instance was per-
missible, but a discharge was illegal and so remanded the case to the
Board to clarify their decision.'0 The original trial examiner again found
that the employers intended the severance to be temporary and only for
the duration of the strike. The attorney for the Chicago Association testi-
fied that the employer had intended a legal discharge, not a lockout, and
had also sought to possibly break the union.11 The Board, relying on
this testimony, reversed the trial examiner and declared the employers'
action to be an illegal discharge under the Act. The Board further found
that the intended permanent severance was also for the purpose of dis-
couraging membership in and destroying the union, and thus called for
an award of back pay to the salesmen.' 2 Again on appeal, the Circuit
Court held that it could not rule that evidence relied on by the Board
was unsubstantial or inadequate.'8 In allowing the award of back pay,
the Court affirmed a previous holding that the question of back pay is
a broad discretionary one for the Board and not for the Courts.14 A peti-
5 This letter is reproduced in full in the first opinion of the Court of Appeals,
NLRB v. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 190 F. 2d 576, 579 (C.A. 7th, 1951).
6 Hereinafter referred to as the Board.
7 Hereinafter referred to as the Act.
8 National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 100 (1947).
9 Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950).
10 NLRB v. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 190 F. 2d 576 (C.A. 7th, 1951).
11 The record indicated that hostility had arisen between this witness as counsel
for the Chicago Association and the Illinois Association and that the witness had urged
separate settlement with the union.
1 2 Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952). The court also ruled that
the Old Rose Salesmen, being strikers, were not entitled to back pay unless they had
unconditionally requested reinstatement during the strike.
13 NLRB v. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 204 F. 2d 529 (C.A. 7th, 1953).
14 NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
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tion for certiorari by the Association to the United States Supreme Court
was denied.
It appears that the Board in ruling on the legality of a lockout must
look to the facts of each case and ordinarily the determining factor is
the purpose which prompted the lockout by the employer. 15 The Board
found to be in violation of the Act any motive contrary to the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, which is as follows: "Employees
shall have the right to self organization, to form, join or assist labor or-
ganizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining, or other mutual aid or protection.""' Thus, when
the employer's main purpose was to prevent unionization,"7 discourage
union membership,' compel membership in a company union, 19 or avoid
contractual obligations to a union,20 the action was ruled illegal. But in
the absence of an unlawful motive, the Board has allowed lockouts where
the objective was: to take advantage of a more profitable business site,21
to accomplish needed repairs, 22 to avoid business losses, 28 or to avoid
spoilage of materials. 24
The question of whether employers in a multi-bargaining unit may
lock out their employees in retaliation for the union's whipsawing action
is of recent origin and is a highly controversial issue. It is an important
factor in the struggle between labor and management for the ever chang-
ing balance of power. This is clearly evidenced by the intervention of
employer and labor groups as arnici curiae in the Court of Appeals dur-
ing the instant case.25
15 51 Mich. L. Rev. 421 (1953).
16 National Labor Relations Act: 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. S 101 (1947).
17 NLRB v. Long Lake Lumber Co., 138 F. 2d 363 (C.A. 9th, 1943).
18 NLRB v. Cape County Milling Co., 140 F. 2d 543 (C.A. 8th, 1944).
19 NLRB v. Cowell Portland Cement Co., 148 F. 2d 237 (C.A. 9th, 1945).
20 Gerity Whitaker Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 393 (1941); modified, 137 F. 2d 198 (C.A. 6th,
1942); cert. denied, 318 U.S. 763 (1943).
21 Brown-McLaren Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 894(1941).
22 Georgia Twine & Cordage Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 84 (1946); modified, 172 F. 2d 293
(C.A. 5th, 1948).
28 Hobbs, Wall & Co., 30 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1941).
24 Link Belt Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 227 (1940).
25 Labor groups who filed amici briefs: American Federation of Labor; International
Brotherhood of Teamsters; Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America;
Bakery and Confectionery Workers International Union of America; Retail Clerks
International Association; and Liquor and Wine Salesmen's Union, Local 62, affiliated
with Distillery Rectifying and Wine Workers International Union of America.
EmDloyer groups: Union Employers Section, Printing Industry of America, Inc.;
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When the union strikes only one employer of a multi-employer bar-
gaining unit, none of the remaining dealers know whether or not they
are next to have their employees strike in the continuous whipsawing
process. The employer who is struck suffers business losses while the
fellow members of the bargaining unit, who are also his competitors,
take over his profits. Meanwhile the union is able to support the small
segment of strikers almost indefinitely.
To alleviate this situation, the employers choose to look upon a strike
against one member of the unit as a strike against all members and re-
taliate by locking out all union employees, thus placing an equal burden
on the union. Invariably, after the action terminates, the union files
charges against the employer for an unfair labor practice and the Board,
as in this case, is called on to give their decision.
Excepting the Morand Bros. case, the only other recent case to reach
the Court of Appeals on this problem was Leonard v. NLRB26 which
was decided subsequent to the instant case. There the employers locked
out their employees to offset a whipsawing movement by the union, but
the employees were retained on the payrolls and their seniority and other
benefits were protected when the strike was settled. Thus, there was no
question but that the employers intended merely a temporary lockout.
The Board completely ignored the effects of the whipsawing action on
the economic position of the employer and held that such a lockout
would violate the Act. But the Court of Appeals held that the Act rela-
tive to discrimination to discourage membership in labor organizations
or to the refusal of the employer to bargain collectively was not violated.
The Court in overruling the Board followed the reasoning in the instant
case and allowed employers to invoke a temporary lockout where the
union has begun a whipsawing action. The result, however, was contrary
to that of the instant case since the Court in the Leonard case found that
the employees had been merely locked out while the decision of the
instant case was based on the finding that the employees had been per-
manently discharged.
Not in every instance, however, has the Board held such retaliatory
action to be illegal. In Matter of Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc.27 the National
Labor Relations Board trial examiner expressed the opinion that the em-
ployer is not prohibited from taking reasonable measures where such
measures are, under the circumstances, necessary for the avoidance of
San Francisco Employers Council; Chicago Bakery Employers Labor Council; Seattle
Department Stores Association; and National Beer Wholesalers Association of Ameri-
ca.
26205 F. 2d 355 (CA. 9th, 1953).
2796 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951).
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economic loss or business disruption attendant upon an unannounced
strike. The Board completely adopted this view and held that a multi-
employer shutdown was lawful because prompted by economic uncer-
tainty caused by the union's threat to strike the other employers without
notice. It is also to be noted that in both Morand Bros. v. NLRB and
Leonard v. NLRB the Board was split in its decision. Chairman Herzog,
dissenting to the Board's ruling in the Leonard case, insisted that the
lockout in question was being used as a legitimate weapon of resistance
to union demands and was not an attempt to destroy the union.28
The Court of Appeals in refusing to overrule the Board in the instant
case based its decision on the grounds that there was conflicting testi-
mony before the Board concerning whether or not the employers in-
tended a lockout or a permanent discharge, and since the Board felt that
the greater weight of the evidence revealed a discharge rather than a
lockout, the court could only consider, on review, the substantiality of
the evidence on which the Board's decision was based. In so doing, the
Court gives management the right to counteract one of labor's most ef-
fective weapons, the whipsaw. If the employers, however, were not al-
lowed to retaliate in this instance, they would be at the mercy of the
union. This would tend to tear down the concept of collective bargain-
ing which has helped create desirable uniformity and stability in labor
conditions.29 Even though Section 7 of the Act gives employees the right
to concerted activity with no mention of employers, the basic purpose of
the N.L.R.A., as amended, is to remedy inequalities in permissible pres-
sures between labor and management.80 The lockout impliedly recog-
nized in the 1947 amendment to the National Labor Relations Act should
be seen for what it actually is-the employer's means of asserting
economic pressure on unions and a corollary of the union's right to strike.
The late Senator Taft, Senate author of the Taft-Hartley Act,31 stated
that the basic theory of the Bill is an attempt to create equality between
the employer and the employee.8 2
Thus, it seems that in the interest of multi-employer bargaining the
28 Davis Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1952).
29 See Rayonier, Inc., 52 N.L.R.B. 1269, 1273-74 (1943). See also The Multi-Employer
Lockout, 3 Utah Law Rev. 122, 125 (1952). It has aso been said to be a defensive
technique for small businessmen against the demands of strengthened unions. Multi-
Employer Bargaining and the National Labor Relations Board, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 886
(1953).
80 Sen. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 407 (1947).
81 The National Labor Relations Act as amended is presently incorporated within
the Taft-Hartley Act.
82 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, Vol. 2, p. 1206
(1947).
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federal courts are establishing precedent to the effect that the employer
may lock out his union employees to counteract a whipsaw, unless the
purpose of the lockout is to interfere with the concerted activities pro-
tected by Section 7, or to escape the duty to bargain collectively, as pre-
scribed by Section 8(d) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act.8
SALES-BLANK ENDORSEMENTS OF MOTOR VEHICLE
TITLE CERTIFICATES
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant finance company
to recover possession of an automobile which had been wrongfully
mortgaged by a used car dealer who had agreed to sell that vehicle for
the plaintiff owner. The owner had delivered two vehicles to the used
car dealer together with the title certificates endorsed in blank, but with
the spaces for the names of the assignees left blank. The dealer was to
fill in the name of the assignee for each vehicle when he had made the
sale and was also to have the certificates notarized. Before any sale had
been made, the dealer gave chattel mortgages on the two automobiles
to the finance company on the strength of the two title certificates which
had been endorsed in blank. The dealer later defaulted on the mortgages,
and the finance company took possession of one of the two automobiles.
The court held that failure to fill the blank spaces on the certificates and
the failure to have the certificates notarized made the certificates defective
on their face. Hawkins v. M. & 1. Finance Corp., 238 N.C. 174, 77 S.E.
2d 669 (1953).
The defendant argued that the owner had estopped himself from claim-
ing ownership as against the finance company by cloaking the dealer
with indicia of ownership. Testimony was introduced that the custom of
used car dealers is to buy old cars without a formal assignment made
to the dealer by the former owner. Upon resale of the vehicle, the name
of the new buyer is inserted in the space reserved for the name of the
assignee, thus creating the impression that the transaction took place
between the original owner and the subsequent buyer without inter-
mediate ownership by the dealer.
The court discussed the North Carolina statute" regulating the transfer
of title to automobiles and held, that compliance with the statute was
required in the assignment of the certificate of title before the certificate
could be an indicium of ownership. The court stated that the assignment
of title by the owner's blank endorsement, which does not name the
88 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. S 101 (1947).
1 N.C. Gen. Stat. (recompiled, 1953) c. 20, S 72.
